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 MORS MONOGRAPH:
 MILITARY MODELING
 Fore ward (excerpts)
 Amoretta M. Hoeber
 PDASA(RDA)
 There comes a time in every profession
 when it is appropriate to record the core of
 wisdom generated by and shared among
 the practitioners and theorists of their
 craft. The origin of this monograph was
 the conviction shared by four past presi-
 dents of the Military Operations Research
 Society that such a time had come. Mili-
 tary operations research has been practiced
 for forty years; arguably for a great deal
 longer. The military operations research
 profession has existed formally since the
 establishment of degree granting programs
 in operations analysis nearly concurrently
 at both the US Naval Postgraduate School
 and the Case Intitute of Technology in
 1951. The profession of Operations Re-
 search in fact antedates the popularity of
 HOW NEW
 IS OR?
 the term model itself, though not the use of
 models.
 During that forty years we have learned
 a great deal about modeling, expanding on
 the seminal theories of such pioneers as
 Bernard Koopman, PMS Blackett, Phi-
 lip Morse, George Kimball, and Glenn
 Kent. But mostly we have taught our-
 selves, in the school of hard knocks, about
 both uses and misuses of models.
 The generations that flourished in those
 first forty years are yielding to a new
 generation, with its own set of attitudes
 and tools. It is a computer generation, pro-
 ficient in hand-held calculators and desk
 top computers, born and raised on Avalon
 Hill war games and Atari simulations. It is
 a generation that believes large scale inte-
 gration is old hat and takes the future of
 artificial intelligence for granted. The very
 power of modern modeling tools and the
 attitudes, half-unconscious, they generate
 impel a review of the strengths and limita-
 tions of models of every description for
 every application in defense analysis.
 The centerpiece of this monograph is
 the Overview. It was drafted by Wayne
 Hughes to describe military models across
 all of their dimensions. It was then re-
 viewed and revised by a committee, the
 members of which were chosen for their
 breadth of experience, their diversity of
 viewpoint and for the respect they have
 earned in the profession of military op-
 rations research. As will be seen, for once
 only a committee could have carried out a
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 The aim of the Overview is to discuss
 orthodox military modeling. The com-
 mittee endeavored to collate the collective
 wisdom and experience of the profession,
 debating not their own predispositions, but
 what they ascribed to be the beliefs held by
 the military operations research communi-
 ty as a whole. They found a surprisingly
 large set of commonly held lore, insights
 and judgments. Moreover there may be
 underway a further convergence of views.
 This monograph may well serve to hasten
 that process.
 Following the Overview are fifteen
 chapters written by expert practitioners.
 Taken together these chapters elaborate on
 and exemplify the general conclusions in
 the Overview. Each chapter is intensely
 personal; each writer draws from his own
 EXPERTS HAVE
 THEIR SAY
 experience, aiming for depth and richness
 of illustration, without necessarily
 attempting to cover all aspects of his sub-
 ject. For example, both J.J. Martin and
 Thomas A. Brown review a considerable
 amount of history; others do not. John
 Friel, Wilbur Payne and Robert Hallex
 not only describe the characteristics of
 good air, land and sea battle models, but
 each does so with a different slant,
 drawing on his especial operational, con-
 ceptual and technical strengths.
 Some chapter authors go beyond what is
 currently accepted practice and project
 what in their fields is likely to be desirable
 in the future. Martin, Payne, Stephen
 Drezner and Richard Hillestad describe
 from their own perspective what should be
 done to improve modeling of nuclear war-
 fare, land battle, and logistics. But these
 changes are all consistent with the princi-
 ples and good practices in the Overview.
 One of the early substantive focus
 points of this monograph was to put in
 better perspective what is variously called
 validation and verification. The Over-
 view, with its concept of "corroboration"
 as the more accurate term, Clayton Tho-
 mas' Chapter 13, and Wilbur Payne's
 Chapter 14, together serve as a needed
 reference point for future discussions. The
 monograph is not the last word, but it is
 certainly a suitable first word by MORS on
 the subject of verification and validation.
 INTRODUCTION (Excerpts)
 Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., US
 Navy (Retired)
 From the outset, our purpose in drawing
 together a committee on military modeling
 has been to record the collective wisdom
 of the military operations research com-
 munity, with these aims:
 • To describe the attributes of well-
 conceived military models, and their
 limitations;
 • To show how models can contribute to
 the decision process;
 • To remind the reader how models can be
 misused and oversold.
 Our notional reader is the military or
 civilian professional who has a grasp of
 military operations and the defense deci-
 sion process, but only a superficial ac-
 quaintance with the models that inform the
 process. He may be a decisionmaker who
 must draw from the modelers' products or
 a fledgling study participant or study
 monitor.
 Along the way we added another set of
 notional readers - the military operations
 research community itself. Why? Because
 we can all profit by periodically taking a
 broad look at the applications of military
 models as an antidote to our narrow view
 of what a model is and how it should be
 used.
 For many an analyst, "model" flashes a
 vision of a computer simulation of a battle-
 field. For him the art of model building is
 the construction, maintenance, and im-
 provement of complicated machine sim-
 ulations that may be put to use for a variety
 of applications - standing models. Many
 such models are listed in the Catalog of
 Wargaming and Military Simulation Mod-
 els issued by the Joint Chiefs' Studies,
 Analysis, and Gaming Agency (SAGA).
 For another analyst typical of many in
 the studies community, a model is con-
 structed ad hoc to aid an analysis for a
 cl ent who faces a decision. This analyst
 tailors his measure of effectiveness, input
 variables, and parameters according to the
 specific issue at hand.
 For decisionmakers at all levels who
 understand and appreciate the utility of
 mo els, the image may be a fairly simple
 set of mathematical relationships that "get
right to the important variables," all of
 which will fit easily on the back of the
 proverbial envelope.
 Thus we have much to say both to the
 novitiate in the world of models and their
 applications, and to the professional who
 has not thought lately about the other uses
 to which many types of models are being
 applied.
 The 40 year history of military OR is a
 compression of the history of science it-
 self:
 • A discovery of the power of disciplined
 t ought to solve practical problems;
 • A probing of the underlying structure of
 phenomena and the construction of
 theories and models that expanded our
 understanding of these phenomena;
 • An explosion of optimism culminating
 in an "Age of Reason" in which it was
 said that all the universe was going to
 come under the sway of logical thought,
 and the scientific method was the special
 path to knowledge and verity;
 • • And an age of disillusionment in which
 idealists turned cynical, patrons turned
 scornful, and ultimate truth continued
 to recede beyond grasp.
 Among the many quotations that
 express the relationship between intellect




 and heart - one from Clausewitz seems to
 capture the essential role of military anal-
 ysis and particularly of modeling:
 If theory investigates the subjects which
 constitute War; if it separates more dis-
 tinctly that which at first sight seems
 amalgamated; if it explains fully the prop-
 erties of the means; if it shows their prob-
 able effects ; if it makes evident the nature
 of objects ; if it brings to bear all over the
 field of War the light of essentially critical
 investigation - then it has fulfilled the
 chief dues of its province.
 But understanding the role that intellect
 plays in planning and winning war is only
 the beginning of wisdom. The most impor-
 tant thing we would have the reader take
 away from this work is a better under-
 standing of the importance of experience,
 knowledge of subject matter, knowledge
 of technique, and - in the very best work
 - the genius of creativity. H
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